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“末日博士”鲁比尼预言: 中国经济很可能在 2013 年后硬着陆 _fufu_中国_淘股吧_查看帖...

“末日博士”鲁比尼预言: 中国经济很可能 在 2013 年后硬着陆

【 原创: fufu2011-04-23 22:27 坛 浏览/回复 1877/29

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China’s Bad Growth Bet [淘股吧] Nouriel Roubini 2011-04-14

LONDON – I recently took two trips to China just as the government launched its 12th Five-Year Plan to rebalance the country’s long-term growth model. My visits deepened my view that there is a potentially destabilizing contradiction between China’s short- and medium-term economic

performance.

China’s economy is overheating now, but, over time, its current overinvestment will prove deflationary both domestically and globally. Once increasing fixed investment becomes impossible – most likely after 2013 – China is poised for a sharp slowdown. Instead of focusing on securing a soft landing today, Chinese policymakers should be worrying about the brick wall that economic growth may hit in the second half of the quinquennium.

Despite the rhetoric of the new Five-Year Plan – which, like the previous one, aims to increase the share of consumption in GDP – the path of least resistance is the status quo. The new plan’s details reveal continued reliance on investment, including public housing, to support growth, rather than faster currency appreciation, substantial fiscal transfers to households, taxation and/or privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), liberalization of the household registration (hukou) system, or an easing of financial repression.

China has grown for the last few decades on the back of export-led industrialization and a weak currency, which have resulted in high corporate and household savings rates and reliance on net exports and fixed investment (infrastructure, real estate, and industrial capacity for import-competing and export sectors). When net exports collapsed in 2008-2009 from 11% of GDP to 5%, China’s leader reacted by further increasing the fixed-investment share of GDP from 42% to 47%.

Thus, China did not suffer a severe recession – as occurred in Japan, Germany, and elsewhere in emerging Asia in 2009 – only because fixed investment exploded. And the fixed-investment share of GDP has increased further in 2010-2011, to almost 50%.

The problem, of course, is that no country can be productive enough to reinvest 50% of GDP in new capital stock without eventually facing immense overcapacity and a staggering non-performing loan problem. China is rife with overinvestment in physical capital, infrastructure, and

property. To a visitor, this is evident in sleek but empty airports and bullet trains (which will reduce the need for the 45 planned airports), highways to nowhere, thousands of colossal new central and provincial government buildings, ghost towns, and brand-new aluminum smelters kept closed to prevent global prices from plunging.

Commercial and high-end residential investment has been excessive, automobile capacity has outstripped even the recent surge in sales, and overcapacity in steel, cement, and other manufacturing sectors is increasing further. In the short run, the investment boom will fuel inflation, owing to the highly resource-intensive character of growth. But overcapacity will lead inevitably to serious deflationary pressures, starting with the manufacturing and real-estate sectors.

Eventually, most likely after 2013, China will suffer a hard landing. All historical episodes of excessive investment – including East Asia in the 1990’s – have ended with a financial crisis and/or a long period of slow growth. To avoid this fate,

China needs to save less, reduce fixed investment, cut net exports as a share of GDP, and boost the share of consumption.

The trouble is that the reasons the Chinese save so much and consume so little are structural. It will take two decades of reforms to change the incentive to overinvest.

Traditional explanations for the high savings rate (lack of a social safety net, limited public services, aging of the population, underdevelopment of consumer finance, etc.) are only part of the puzzle. Chinese consumers do not have a greater propensity to save than Chinese in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan; they all save about 30% of disposable income. The big difference is that the share of China’s GDP going to the household sector is below 50%, leaving little for consumption.

Several Chinese policies have led to a massive transfer of income from politically weak households to politically powerful companies. A weak currency reduces

household purchasing power by making imports expensive, thereby protecting import-competing SOEs and boosting exporters’ profits.

Low interest rates on deposits and low lending rates for firms and developers mean that the household sector’s massive savings receive negative rates of return, while the real cost of borrowing for SOEs is also negative. This creates a powerful incentive to overinvest and implies enormous redistribution from households to SOEs, most of which would be losing money if they had to borrow at market-equilibrium interest rates. Moreover, labor repression has caused wages to grow much more slowly than productivity.

To ease the constraints on household income, China needs more rapid exchange-rate appreciation, liberalization of interest rates, and a much sharper increase in wage growth. More importantly, China needs either to privatize its SOEs, so that their profits become income for households, or to tax their profits at a far higher rate and transfer the fiscal gains to households. Instead,

on top of household savings, the savings – or retained earnings – of the corporate sector, mostly SOEs, tie up another 25% of GDP.

But boosting the share of income that goes to the household sector could be hugely disruptive, as it could bankrupt a large number of SOEs, export-oriented firms, and provincial governments, all of which are politically powerful. As a result, China will invest even more under the current Five-Year Plan.

Continuing down the investment-led growth path will exacerbate the visible glut of capacity in manufacturing, real estate, and infrastructure, and thus will intensify the coming economic slowdown once further fixed-investment growth becomes impossible. Until the change of political leadership in 2012-2013, China’s policymakers may be able to maintain high growth rates, but at a very high foreseeable cost.

Nouriel Roubini is Chairman of Roubini Global Economics (www.roubini.com), professor of Economics at

the Stern School of Business at NYU and co-author of Crisis Economics, whose paperback edition is forthcoming this month.

【 · 原创: fufu 2011-04-23 22:49 只看该作者(-1)



比较有意思的是 2013 这个时间点,老外对于中国政 治也是相当了解啊! 正好看到网上有中文译文, 顺便贴上来。 [淘股吧]

最*我先后两次踏足中国,恰逢政府启动十二五计 划,以重新调整其长期增长模式。而这两次访问,使我更加 深信,中国的短期和中期经济状况之间,存在着可能影响稳 定的潜在冲突性因素。

中国经济目前已经过热,但再过一段时间,当前的 过度投资,将引发其国内乃至全球的通货紧缩;一旦不断增 加的固定资产投资无以为继 ─ 这很可能在 2013 年发生 ─ 中国经济的发展就可能严重放缓。

可见中国的政策制定者,应当关注的不是如何确保 在当前实现软着陆,而是经济发展可能在五年计划后半段, 出现严重受阻的问题。

虽然新计划也像上一个五年计划那样,宣称要增大 消费占 GDP 的比例。但对政府来说,政治阻力最小的做法 依然是维持现状。公开发布的新计划细节也显示:经济的增 长依然要仰仗投资(包括兴建公共住房)来支撑,而不是以 实施更迅速的货币升值,面向家庭的大规模财政转移支付, 税收和/或国有企业的私有化, 解除户口制度限制以及放宽财 政管制的方式来实现。

过去几十年以来,中国都是靠以出口为导向的工业 化和弱势货币来实现增长,并因此催生了极高的企业和家庭 储蓄率,以及对净进口和固定资产投资(基础设施,房地产 以及来料加工和出口部门的生产能力)的依赖。

当净出口金额从 2008 至 2009 年度的占 GDP11%, 下降到 5%的时候,中国领导人的应对措施,就是将固定资 产投资占 GDP 的比例从 42%拉高到 47%。

凭借着爆发性的固定资产投资,中国得以摆脱了 2009 年日本, 德国和亚洲新兴国家所遭遇的严重经济衰退。 但固定资产投资占国内 GDP 的比例,也因此进一步上升到 2010 至 2010 年度的* 50%。

这就暴露出一个问题:任何国家都不可能拥有足够 的发展速度,足以在将 50% 的 GDP 重新投资的情况下, 最终避免遭遇巨大的产能过剩,和令人忧心的不良贷款问题。 中国内部到处充斥着在实物资本,基础设施和不动产方面的 过量投资。在一个访问者眼中,证据就是那些光鲜靓丽却旅 客寥寥的机场和高速列车,通往偏僻之地的高速公路,数千 座高大的中心城镇和地方政府建筑,空无一人的新城区,以 及被迫关闭以避免引发全球价格下跌的崭新铝冶炼厂。

商业和高级住宅方面的投资早已过剩,汽车的产能 即便在最*的销售热潮中也已经过量了,钢铁,水泥和其他 制造部门的产能过剩问题也在不断恶化。在短期内,这场投 资繁荣将刺激通货膨胀,这是源自于其高度资源密集型的增 长特点。但过剩的产能将无法避免地带来严重的通货紧缩压 力,而制造业和房地产部门则首当其冲。

中国大概会在 2013 年后遭遇一场硬着陆。事实上

所有与过度投资有关的历史场景 ─ 包括在 1990 年代的东 亚地区所发生的一切 ─ 都会以一场金融危机和或长期的低 增长来谢幕。如果要避免这一命运的话,中国需要降低储蓄 率,减少固定资产投资,削减净出口占 GDP 的比例,并刺 激消费所占的比重。

但问题是中国人之所以乐于储蓄而不愿消费,是有 其结构性原因的。而要扭转这一过度投资的诱因,可能需要 整整 20 年的改革。

对于高储蓄率的传统解释(缺乏社会安全网,有限 的公共服务,人口老化,消费信贷的不发达) ,只是这一迷 局的其中一部分。中国大陆地区的消费者并不比香港,新加 坡和台湾等地的同胞更倾向于储蓄─他们都同样会将大概 30% 的可支配收入存起来。但最大的区别在于家庭部门占中国 GDP 的比例小于 50%,因此也只给消费留下了一个很小的 空间。

人民币弱势保护出口

中国实施的一系列政策,都是将大量收入从政治上 处于弱势的家庭转移到了强势的大企业手里;弱势的人民币

使进口商品变得昂贵,降低了家庭购买力,却保护了那些出 口型国企并增加了出口商的利润。

面向家庭的低存款利率和面向企业和开发商的低贷 款利率,意味着千家万户的巨额储蓄实际上的是在赔钱,而 国企的贷款成本却是负数。这就产生了一个强大的过度投资 诱因并意味着从家庭向国企的大规模转移支付 ─ 倘若这些 企业以市场利率贷款的话,肯定是要亏损的。 此外,对工人的压榨,也导致工资上升的幅度,远 远低于生产力的增长速度。

如果要放宽对家庭收入的限制的话,中国必须让人 民币更快地升值,放开利率管制,并大幅增加工资。更重要 的是,中国要么必须将其国企私有化,让这些企业的利润能 转化为家庭收入,要么像这些企业征收更高的税收并将这些 财政收入转移给家庭。事实上,除家庭储蓄之外,企业部门 (大部分为国企)的储蓄─或者说保留利润─已经占到了 GDP 的 25%。

但增加家庭占总收入比例的举措,将产生极大的破 坏效应,因为这会导致一大批国企,出口企业和地方政府破 产, 而这些又是在政治上很有权势的部门。 最终导致的结果,

就是中国只能在这个五年计划中,继续增加投资。

继续沿着这条投资导向的道路走下去,将使已经暴 露出来的制造业,房地产和基础设施产能饱和现象进一步恶 化,并将在固定资产投资增长无法继续扩大的情况下,加剧 未来的经济放缓。但直到领导层在 2012 至 2013 年换届之 前,中国的政策制定者们,都将继续在罔顾巨额未来成本的 情况下维持一个高增长率。[第 5 楼]

咖啡卡 加油券 0/0 【 · 原创: fufu 2011-04-23 23:08 只看该作者(-1) 我觉得这篇文章的分析逻辑还是非常清楚的,至于时间,根 本不必纠结到底是 2011 还是 2012 或者 2013。 [淘股吧] 对于崩溃,最好的观察指标就是房价。2007 年和 2009 年的*肽甓际欠考鄯烧牵2011 年至今为止确实还没 有看到大涨的迹象,这是一个不太好的征兆。我是不太相信 10 年 10 倍后的房价能软着陆的, 不能上涨就只有拐头向下, 】

维持高位盘整的时间很难超过 2 年。

原帖由猪二哥在 2011-04-23 22:55 发表 为什么写 2013 而不是 2011 呢?

经济发展就一定要扛到任期满才谢幕?[第 10 楼]

【 · 转贴 三点 2011-04-24 11:51 只看该作者 (-1) 】

经济的二次探底: [淘股吧] 【 原创: willya02011-04-24 08:20 淘股论坛 浏览/回复 222/4 复制分享 】 只看楼主(-1)

原帖由 willya0 在 2011-04-24 08:20 发表

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[第

22 楼]

咖啡卡 加油券 0/0 【 · 原创: 阿黄 2011-04-24 17:21 只看该作者 (-1) 】 这篇文章一看就是欧美的经典理论,有一些

观点是正确的,还有一些根本就是鸡同鸭讲。就好比一个小 朋友问,红军过草地的时候快饿死了,为什么不吃巧克力 呢? [淘股吧]

关于中国经济过于依赖出口、投资的问题,已经谈 了很久了,事实就是这样。

但是这个博士对于汇率问题和消费问题的解释,实 在是老一套,典型的自由经济原教旨主义,一厢情愿,自说 自话。

他谈到中国人的储蓄率太高消费太少,是因为汇率 太低,购买力不足,所以应该提升人民币汇率,放开利率管 制,私有化,就可以解决了。

是这样吗?答案当然是扯淡了。中国人储蓄率太高 是因为收入水*太低,收入分配太不均了,太多的财富集中 于少数人手中。

为什么中国过于依赖出口,答案还是一样,因为中 国工人的工资太低了,只要出口就赚钱,但赚到的钱只到了 政府和少数*迨掷铮敝泄圃煲踩萌澜绲闹圃煲刀 疯了,以为只要让人民币升值就可以解决问题,其实只要给 中国政府压力,将最低工资水*提高 2 倍,中国的出口肯定 就下来了。可是如果中国出口不行了,中国人的失业率就更 高了,那时候更没有人消费了,没有人消费,中国人的产能 过剩就更严重了。

所以简单来看,中国这 30 年的经济发展其实就是血 的剥削农民工的结果,表现为招商投资,扩大产能,出口, 再投资,再扩大产能,再出口。不出口,就没有再投资,没 有再投资,农民工就难以剥削,最终大家都完蛋,这是一个 饮鸩止渴的过程。因此,中国要解决的首先是如何像当年福 *狄谎霉と擞凶鹧系墓ぷ鳎拍苡凶鹧系南眩 渐将依赖出口的产能转向国内。

私有化能解决问题?同样的反问,血汗工厂难道都

是国有企业吗?再往深里说,就不能提了,制度-你懂得,无 解。

所谓汇率,不过是价格战打不过中国的欧美耍赖的 表现,他们享受着中国血汗工人带来的低物价、低通胀,反 而还要指责中国人。

【 · 原创: 半山僧门 2011-04-24 19:12 只看该作者 (-1) 】

什么卢比尼比基尼,谁也没有自己了解自己。 我只看到,城里人一旦买了房子车子,基本掏空家 底做了银行的奴隶。 农民虽然宅基地不花钱,但是有儿子的娶媳妇必须 要老子出钱盖房子。有几个儿子盖几处房子。 现在消费都小心翼翼, 原因就是没有钱了, 掏空了。 物价飞涨,有点钱也不敢消费。要还贷,孩子上学, 老人看病,自己进修等等。 那个口子送一下,百姓就会舒服点。 政府只要真心实意为民减负, 为民除害, 为民谋福, 社会就乱不起来,经济也垮不掉的。中国人特别能忍耐,特

别能吃苦,但是不能吃气!公*很重要。哪怕公*了自己没 有占到便宜也无所谓。[第 29 楼]




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